Peer-Reviewed Journal Details
Mandatory Fields
Tillman, Seth Barrett
2005
Unknown
Texas Law Review
A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned
Published
()
Optional Fields
83
5
1265
1372
This article is cited 65 times (as of October 4, 2019). The journal this article was published in was: an ELSEVIER/SCOPUS/SJR-ranked law journal, a JCR-ranked law journal, and has an A ranking from the Australia Research Council's last reference. It has an A** from Deakin. It is ranked 16 of 1547 law journals world wide by the Washington & Lee law journal rankings--a top 2% law journal. This is a primary law journal. It is ranked by HeinOnline as a top-100 law review. Madison, in his Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention (Aug. 15 & Aug. 16, 1787), suggested it meant the following: Every [bill by whatever name Congress calls it] to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [because it has legislative effect] (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of [other] Bill[s] [properly stylized when enacted per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2]. Thus, this clause is usually called the residual presentment clause — or, the second presentment clause: it ensures presentment in spite of feared Madisonian legislative legerdemain attempting to manipulatively bypass the President’s veto, which is already provided for in the prior clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (the Presentment or Veto Clause). I have good reason to believe Madison erred, or, more likely, modern courts and commentators have seriously misunderstood Madison’s Notes. In this paper, I put forward the view of a Commonwealth parliamentarian with whom I corresponded on this question. He is very well informed with regard to eighteenth century British and colonial parliamentary and administrative (treasury) practices. Indeed, my research relied extensively on contacts with foreign parliamentary officers, and legislative clerks & secretaries. Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house of Congress] to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [as prior statutory authorization] (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect [as a regulation per the prior organic act], shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill [which is a different case]. This (proposed) new meaning for Clause 3 stands our separation of powers jurisprudence on its head. It means the Supreme Court’s opinion in INS v. Chadha — broadly speaking — was fundamentally misconceived. Presentment is necessary, but not bicameralism, where single house orders are first authorized by a prior statute. At a deeper level, it means that our interpretive community — judges, legal academics, academics in related fields (government, political science, history, etc), and lawyers generally — have forgotten what a clause of the Constitution meant.
US
0040-4411
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=475204
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