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The journal this article was published in was: an ELSEVIER/SCOPUS/SJR-ranked law journal, a JCR-ranked law journal, and has an A ranking from the Australia Research Council's last reference. It has an A** from Deakin. It is ranked 16 of 1547 law journals world wide by the Washington & Lee law journal rankings--a top 2% law journal. This is a primary law journal.
This (proposed) new meaning for Clause 3 stands our separation of powers jurisprudence on its head. It means the Supreme Court’s opinion in INS v. Chadha — broadly speaking — was fundamentally misconceived. Presentment is necessary, but not bicameralism, where single house orders are first authorized by a prior statute. At a deeper level, it means that our interpretive community — judges, legal academics, academics in related fields (government, political science, history, etc), and lawyers generally — have forgotten what a clause of the Constitution meant.
Professor Gary S. Lawson has taken the position that although the new view captures the original public meaning of the clause, coordinate constitutional provisions, particularly the vesting clauses of Articles I, II and III, restrict the domain of the clause to congressional subpoenas and contempts.
In this reply, I take the position that Congress's lawmaking powers under the ORV Clause are nearly coextensive with Congress's statutory lawmaking powers. Congress's powers under the ORV Clause extend far beyond congressional subpoenas and contempts.